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Voluntary Disclosure and Political Sensitivity: The Case of 
Executive Remuneration 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This study investigates the relation between firm political sensitivity and the quality and quantity 
of voluntary disclosures, with special reference to the case of executive remuneration 
disclosures. I study the relation between firm political sensitivity and the quality and quantity of 
annual bonus plan disclosures, applying two competing (but not mutually exclusive) theories: 
political cost theory and managerial power theory. Political sensitivity is proxied using the 
magnitude of the annual bonus rather than firm size, which while popular in existing literature, is 
not a perfect proxy for political sensitivity (Ball and Foster, 1982, Meek et al, 1995; Cormier et 
al, 2005).  Results reveal a significant positive relation between disclosure quantity and political 
sensitivity measures, and a significant negative relation between disclosure quality and political 
sensitivity proxies. This indicates that managers who are more susceptible to political sanctions 
related to their remuneration tend to disclose higher volumes of lower quality information.  
Consistent with earlier studies, the results confirm that firm size is related to voluntary 
disclosure, and the results also reveal that the use of remuneration consultants have a significant 
positive effect on disclosure quantity but no impact on disclosure quality.  
 
KEYWORDS: corporate governance, executive remuneration, voluntary disclosure, disclosure 
quality, remuneration consultants.  
JEL Classifications: M52, J33, D82 
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1. Introduction 
 This study investigates the relation between firm political sensitivity and the 
quality and quantity of voluntary disclosures, with special reference to the case of 
executive remuneration disclosures. The evolution of executive remuneration disclosure 
requirements in the UK over the past 15 years, from being minimal and mandatory, to 
comprehensive but voluntary, to the current regime of comprehensive and mandatory, 
illustrates the increasing political costs of disclosure faced by UK firms. While no salary 
cap is currently enforced, political sanctions are implemented via extensive disclosure 
requirements in the hope that greater transparency regarding the executive pay process 
enables shareholders to discipline managers whose remuneration is not commensurate 
with firm performance. The UK Directors‟ Remuneration Report Regulations (DRRR) 
(2002), which formed part of the regulatory response to criticism regarding spiralling 
executive remuneration, require firms to disclose extensive details of long-term 
remuneration plans. In contrast, the regulations remain silent on the level of detail 
required for components of short-term remuneration such as annual bonus plans. The 
discretionary element in the level of disclosures relating to annual bonus plans provides 
an opportunity to study voluntary disclosure behaviour related to executive remuneration. 
Specifically, I study the relation between firm political sensitivity and the quality and 
quantity of annual bonus plan disclosures, applying two competing (but not mutually 
exclusive) theories: political cost theory and managerial power theory.  
Earlier studies have investigated how political sensitivity affects voluntary 
disclosure of financial information. Jones (1991), Cahan (1992), Murphy (1996) and 
  4 
Baker (1999) find that firms react to increasing political costs by disclosing financial 
information designed to reduce their political sensitivity. In terms of the how disclosure 
quantity and quality varies with political sensitivity, Meek et al. (1995) find that 
voluntary disclosure in annual reports is positively related to firm size, which serves as 
their proxy for political sensitivity. Similarly, Raffournier (1999) and Oliveira et al.  
(2005) find that the incidence of increased voluntary financial disclosures and voluntary 
disclosure of intangibles, respectively, are positively associated with firm size. 
Meanwhile, Clarkson, Van Bueren and Walker (2006) find that disclosure quality related 
to executive remuneration is positively related to public scrutiny of the firm, which the 
authors measure using the number of articles containing the phrase “executive 
remuneration” appearing in the Australian Financial Review between 1999 and 2004.  
While existing studies document a link between aspects of firms‟ disclosure 
strategy and political sensitivity broadly defined, existing studies overlook three 
important issues. First, extant research does not simultaneously compare the impact of 
political sensitivity on disclosure quality and disclosure quantity using the same data set. 
Second, existing studies have yet to study disclosures relating to UK executive 
remuneration. Third, firm size is popularly used proxy for the level of political sensitivity 
a firm faces. While plausible, size is also considered to be a noisy proxy as it firm size 
captures a multitude of other factors (Ball and Foster, 1982, Meek et al., 1995; Cormier 
et al., 2005). To shed new light on these issues I construct distinct measures of disclosure 
quality and quantity, and examine the impact of political sensitivity on each dimension 
separately. In particular, I analyse voluntary disclosures relating to annual bonus 
arrangements for executive directors, and how the quantity and quality of such 
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disclosures vary in response to concerns regarding excessive executive remuneration. I 
also use the magnitude of executive remuneration to proxy for the level of political 
sensitivity a firm faces as a way to overcome the imperfect proxy often used in existing 
literature, firm size.  
My analysis is motivated by two alternative (but not necessarily mutually 
exclusive) theoretical perspectives on the link between political sensitivity and 
disclosure. On the one hand, the relation between political sensitivity and corporate 
disclosure can be explained by the political cost theory (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978), 
which predicts that managers seek to minimise political costs by providing more 
extensive, higher quality disclosures so as to pre-empt political sanctions (Zimmerman, 
1983; Meek, et al. ,1995; Raffournier, 1999; Oliviera et al., 2005; Baker, 1999). On the 
other hand, managerial power theory argues that managerial opportunism overrides arms-
length transactions and bargaining, resulting in managers trying to camouflage their rent-
extraction activities (Bebchuk et al., 2002). According to this theory, greater sensitivity 
over remuneration levels leads to lower quality disclosures designed to hide managerial 
opportunism in the form of excessive compensation.  
My analysis is based on data for 400 large UK firms. I measure disclosure quality 
by creating an index which scores disclosures according to the transparency and detail 
with which information on executives‟ short-term bonus arrangements are reported. The 
index is created by benchmarking information on annual bonus plans produced in the 
remuneration report with disclosures for long-term plans mandated by the Directors‟ 
Remuneration Report Regulations (2002), and with best practice disclosure 
recommendations established by the Association of British Insurers (ABI) and the 
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National Association of Pension Funds (NAPF). Disclosure quantity, on the other hand, 
is measured as the number of pages in the remuneration report as a fraction of the total 
number of pages in the annual report. To capture political sensitivity specific to executive 
remuneration (annual bonus) disclosures, I use data on annual bonuses paid to executive 
directors, measured using both the raw value and as abnormal payments conditional on 
firm performance. Remuneration information are obtained from Manifest Ltd in the first 
instance, and in the case of incomplete information, supplemented with data manually 
extracted from published annual reports.   
Results reveal a significant positive relation between disclosure quantity and 
political sensitivity measures, and a significant negative relation between disclosure 
quality and political sensitivity proxies. This indicates that managers who are more 
susceptible to political sanctions related to their remuneration tend to disclose higher 
volumes of lower quality information. Overall, the results are consistent with the 
managerial power hypothesis.  
In addition to the main findings, I also observe that when firms employ a 
compensation consultant, there is a significant positive effect on disclosure quantity but 
no impact on disclosure quality. I also observe a significant positive firm size effect 
consistent with prior research (see, for instance, Meek et al., 1995; Oliviera, et al., 2005; 
Raffournier, 1999).  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section discusses 
the motivation for the paper, reviews prior studies and formulates my hypothesis. Section 
3 then discusses the methodology used, followed by a discussion of the sample and data 
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collection process in Section 4. I present the results of the study in Section 5, and Section 
6 concludes.  
 
2. Motivation, Literature Review and Hypotheses 
Institutional Setting and Research Motivation 
 The governance of executive remuneration-related disclosures in the UK 
traditionally fell under the jurisdiction of the Companies Act. In the early 1990‟s, the 
accounting profession and the London Stock Exchange commissioned a series of reports 
in response to the financial scandals that rocked the UK corporate sector at that time, 
notably that of Polly Peck, BCCI and Maxwell. The first of those reports, the Cadbury 
Report (1992) suggested additional executive remuneration disclosure requirements 
beyond those required by the Companies Act but it was the Greenbury Report (1995) that 
focused specifically on issues relating to executive remuneration. The recommendations 
regarding executive remuneration disclosure made by the Cadbury Report (1992) and the 
Greenbury Report (1995) formed part of the Combined Code (2001). However, there was 
no legal onus on firms to comply with the Combine Code‟s recommendations. Instead, 
should a firm not wish to comply with the recommendations, they could opt out by 
providing shareholders with a statement explaining their reasons for non-compliance. 
This situation changed in 2002 when a review of boardroom pay practices resulted in 
amendments to the Companies Act. For reporting periods ending on or after 31 
December 2002, firms have been required to present a separate remuneration report with 
comprehensive executive remuneration information as part of the annual report to 
shareholders.  
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 Prior to the 2002 boardroom pay-related revisions, Company Law required firms 
to disclose aggregate amounts of directors‟ remuneration, pensions and severance pay as 
part of the notes to the accounts. The Cadbury Report (1992) recommended that 
disclosures of directors‟ remuneration, the chairman and the highest paid UK-director 
should be separated into salary and performance-related pay elements, and disclosed as 
part of a corporate governance report that. Cadbury (1992) also suggested the criteria of 
performance-related aspects of pay should be disclosed, and that information regarding 
stock options, stock appreciation rights and pension contributions should also be 
discussed.  
The next report to be published, the Greenbury Report, focused on improving the 
link between pay and performance. The Greenbury Report (1995) expanded suggestions 
of the  Cadbury Report (1992), recommending that firms report full details of all 
elements of executive remuneration packages, broken down by salary, benefits in kind, 
annual bonuses and long-term incentives (including share options) for individual 
directors. Greenbury (1995) also recommends that firms disclose their remuneration 
policy, pension entitlements, and details on option grants, service contracts and directors‟ 
shareholdings in a report addressed to shareholders prepared by the Remuneration 
Committee.
1
 With greater disclosure of how and what executives are paid, shareholders 
are better equipped to evaluate how managerial pay relates to firm performance.  
The Combined Code (1998, 2001) adopted the recommendations of the Cadbury 
(1992) and Greenbury (1995) Reports. However, these recommendations were voluntary 
and did not carry the force of law. Firms listed on the London Stock Exchange had the 
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option not to comply with the recommendations provided they explain any instances of 
non-compliance.  
A boardroom pay review exercise carried out by the Department of Trade and 
Industry in 2001 changed the executive remuneration reporting requirements. A 
comprehensive set of remuneration-related disclosures called the Directors‟ 
Remuneration Report Regulations (DRRR) (2002) was appended to the Companies Act, 
effectively adding the force of law to detailed remuneration reporting. The DRRR 
(2002), which became effective for firms reporting on or after 31 December 2002 
required firms to prepare a separate stand-alone remuneration report as part of the annual 
report containing information pertaining to performance targets and benchmarks used in 
long term incentive plans, details of service contracts and termination pay, and a graph 
depicting the firm‟s total shareholder return relative to the performance of a chosen 
index. In addition to these disclosure requirements, the DRRR (2002) also requires the 
following details of directors‟ remuneration to be audited: total compensation, share 
options and long-term incentive plans, pensions for each director, excess retirement 
benefits of past directors, compensation paid to past directors and sums paid to third 
parties in respect of a director‟s services. 
Over the past two decades, executive remuneration disclosure has therefore 
moved from being mandatory in nature and minimal in detail (Companies Act prior to 
2002), to being voluntary in nature and comprehensive in scope (Cadbury, Greenbury 
and Combined Code recommendations, on top of the minimal Companies Act 
requirements), to being mandatory in nature, comprehensive in detail and requiring audit 
(Directors‟ Remuneration Report Regulations, 2002). This has changed the landscape of 
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remuneration reporting in the UK substantially. A wealth of previously unavailable 
remuneration-related information is now required to be disclosed as part of the annual 
report, and management no longer have the choice to ignore disclosure requirements and 
provide an explanation of non-compliance.  
While the comprehensive nature of disclosure requirements leave little room for 
managerial choice in reporting long-term remuneration information, managerial 
discretion is still exists in two key areas. First, the choice of index against which firms‟ 
total shareholder return is measured and reported in graphical form. Second, the amount 
of information provided about short-term remuneration arrangements (e.g. bonus plans). 
In particular, the Directors‟ Remuneration Report Regulations requires disclosures of the 
use of annual bonus plans but leaves disclosure of plan details such as performance 
measures, reward targets and benchmarks to the discretion of management.  
I exploit the discretionary nature of annual bonus plan disclosures to study how 
firms‟ political sensitivity affects disclosure strategies. In particular, I test whether 
political sensitivity regarding remuneration arrangements affects how managers report 
annual bonus scheme information. In the next section I discuss the theoretical basis of the 
research question and review the related literature examining the relation between 
disclosure strategies and political sensitivity.  
 
Theoretical Framework and Literature 
 The actions, reactions, achievements and misfortunes of firms are part of the 
socio-economic environment in which they operate. Firms are often criticised if they 
undertake what is perceived by stakeholders to be unwise decisions relating to issues 
such as the environment (Deegan and Gordon, 1996), make what stakeholders perceive 
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to be excessive profit (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978), or pay their managers what 
stakeholders view as excessive remuneration (Baker, 1999). These issues, when raised by 
various stakeholder groups, can result in political sanctions against firms including 
increased tax rates (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978) and demands for greater transparency 
(Deegan and Gordon, 1996). Managers therefore have an interest in managing politically 
sensitive issues to minimise political costs. This translates into subsequent action taken 
by managers, for example by making decisions regarding accounting methods used, or 
what information is disclosed. Cahan (1992) finds managers of firms under investigation 
for monopoly-related violations managed earnings during periods of investigation when 
the firm‟s earnings were perceived to be more politically sensitive. Jones (1991) also 
found that managers manipulated earnings downwards during periods of import relief 
investigations to decrease firm political sensitivity.  
Evidence from the remuneration literature also suggests that choices made to 
manage excessive managerial remuneration are also motivated by political sensitivity. 
Murphy (1996) finds that managers prefer to report grant-date values of options in their 
SEC filings only when they are lower than potential option values. He also finds that 
when stocks are volatile and dividend yields are low, larger discounts are applied to the 
grant-date values. Baker (1999) finds that firms with higher components of unexplained 
remuneration (remuneration not related to performance) are more likely to report lower 
grant-date values of options. Both disclosure strategies observed by Murphy (1996) and 
Baker (1999) result in lower reported values of remuneration. 
 Existing evidence also documents that levels of voluntary disclosure are 
influenced by firms‟ political visibility and sensitivity. Meek et al. (1995) find that high 
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levels of voluntary disclosure are significantly related to firm size, which proxies for 
political sensitivity. Raffournier (1999) reports a similarly strong positive relation 
between voluntary financial disclosures and firm size for a sample of Swiss firms. 
Oliviera et al. (2005) find that the quantity of intangible-related disclosures increases 
with firm size for a sample of firms listed on the Lisbon Euronext market. However, a 
drawback of these studies is the use of size to proxy for political sensitivity. Ball and 
Foster (1982) argue that while firm size affects political sensitivity (as proposed by Watts 
and Zimmerman, 1978), it may also capture other factors. Ball and Foster (1982) 
demonstrate that in relation to political sensitivity, size has also been used to proxy for 
competitive advantage (Belkaoui and Kahl, 1978) and information product cost (Firth, 
1979). I further discuss this issue and how it is addressed in this paper in the next section. 
 The motivation of this study follows from the above observations. It examines 
how the level of voluntary disclosure of remuneration information is affected by how 
sensitive firms are to what the public observes its managerial remuneration to be. I seek 
to explain this relation using two competing theories: political cost theory and managerial 
power theory. 
Political cost theory builds from the economic theories of the political process, 
which is viewed as a competition for wealth transfers. Political processes are also used as 
a way to remedy what is perceived by stakeholders to be market failures. According to 
political cost theory, executives are hypothesized to manage the visibility of politically 
sensitive information so as to minimise potential wealth transfers from the firm as a 
result of sanctions. The political cost hypothesis predicts that when managers are 
presented with a choice in reporting information about the firm, managers prefer choices 
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that decrease political sensitivity. Politically sensitive firms are therefore expected to 
provide disclosures that are high in quality and quantity to circumvent further political 
sanctions.  
 The managerial power theory of executive remuneration contends that the arms‟ 
length transaction assumption inherent in managerial contracting models does not hold 
because it is overridden by managerial power (Bebchuk et al., 2002). The close social 
network among boards of director is argued to increase managerial bargaining power. 
The theory introduced the terms „outrage‟, referring to stakeholder reaction towards 
excessive pay,  and „camouflage‟, referring to techniques managers use to hide excessive 
pay from stakeholders. Bebchuk et al. (2002) argue that managers take actions to 
minimise „outrage‟ through „camouflage‟ techniques such as hiding remuneration 
elements in complicated remuneration schemes or making opaque disclosures.  
Of the two theories discussed above, political cost theory has been more 
prolifically tested in empirical studies, although not pertaining to executive remuneration. 
To date I am not aware of any study that uses managerial power theory to explain firm 
disclosure policy or managerial choice behaviour. Furthermore, Bebchuk et al.‟s (2002) 
managerial power theory relates to remuneration contracting specifically, whereas 
political cost theory explores agency issues in various settings. As this study examines 
remuneration-related voluntary disclosures, either theory could potentially explain 
disclosure choices. The descriptive validity of the political cost and managerial power 
theories in relation to executive remuneration is an empirical issue, which this analysis 
hopes to shed light on. 
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3. Research Methodology 
 In this section I present the regression models used in the empirical analysis and 
discuss how I measure political sensitivity, disclosure quality and disclosure quantity. I 
then discuss the control variables used in the model.  
 
Regression Models 
 This study employs two ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models. The first 
model tests the association between disclosure quality and political sensitivity. The 
second model tests the relation between disclosure quantity and political sensitivity. The 
disclosure quality model is specified as below: 
itkk
K
k
itit ControlsremmeasureDiscQual  
1
10     (1) 
 
where DiscQual is a proxy for disclosure quality, measured using a normalised 
disclosure quality index score; remmeasure is a proxy for political costs measured using 
average bonus pay across executive board members; Controls is a vector of k additional 
determinants of disclosure quality;  is the error term and i and t are firm and time 
subscripts respectively.  
The disclosure quantity model is specified as below: 
ititjk
J
j
itit ControlsremmeasureDiscQua  
1
10      (2) 
 
where DiscQuant is a proxy for disclosure quantity, measured using the percentage of 
remuneration report pages as part of the annual report; remmeasure is a proxy for 
political costs as defined in equation (1); Controls is a vector of j determinants of 
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disclosure quantity;  is the error term, and i and t are firm and time subscripts 
respectively.  
 Two versions of each model are estimated. In the first version, remmeasure is 
expressed as the mean bonus payment for the executive directors of firm i at time t.
2
 This 
model is referred to as the „raw bonus‟ model. In the second variation, remmeasure for 
equations (1) and (2) is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if managers are 
deemed to be overpaid, and zero otherwise. The technique used to construct the indicator 
variable is discussed in Section 3.3 below. This model is referred to as the „abnormal 
bonus‟ model.  
 
Disclosure Quality and Quantity 
Existing studies relating political sensitivity to corporate disclosure focus 
exclusively on either quality (Clarkson et al., 2006) or quantity (Raffournier, 1999) or 
make no clear attempt to differentiate between the two concepts (Meek et al., 1995). The 
latter is especially problematic as disclosure quantity merely measures the amount of 
disclosure made, without assessment of the usefulness of the information provided. In 
contrast, disclosure quality measures the usefulness of the information to its users. 
Disclosure quantity is not a perfect substitute for disclosure quality: managers are able to 
hide useful information by concealing it among high volumes of uninformative 
disclosures. An underlying reason for the lack of research exploring disclosure quality is 
that it is particularly difficult to measure, due to its subjective nature. The most common 
approach involves defining quality against an external benchmark; based on the 
underlying notion that a third party benchmark of quality provides a degree of objectivity 
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from the perspective of the researcher (e.g. Clarkson et. al (2006). The approach used to 
measure disclosure quality in this study is described below.  
 
Measuring Disclosure Quality 
Muslu (2010) and Clarkson et al (2006) are used as guidance in constructing a 
disclosure quality measurement instrument, as both studies are related to remuneration 
disclosures. Both papers utilised indices measure the quality of remuneration disclosures. 
Clarkson et al (2006) based their index on the Australian Accounting Standard AASB 
1046 – Director and Executive Disclosures by Disclosing Entities. Muslu (2010), 
meanwhile, used the following four criteria to measure disclosure quality: (i) overall 
compensation policy and goals; (ii) pay-setting guidelines for specific positions; (iii) 
executive compensation in previous years; and (iv) future determinants of executive 
compensation. He scored firms using the following method: firms that reported none of 
the above were awarded a score of zero; those that reported some of the above scored 
one; and those that reported all of the above scored two.  
 I follow the approach of Clarkson et al. (2006) and Muslu (2010) and construct an 
index of remuneration disclosure quality. To measure quality, a benchmark against which 
quality can be assessed should be ideally present. I draw on guidance provided by the 
Association of British Insurers (ABI) and the National Association of Pension Funds 
(NAPF) to help define what constitutes informative and high quality remuneration 
disclosures. I also use the disclosure requirements in the DRRR (2002) relating to long-
term incentive plans as an additional benchmark for determining the informative content 
of disclosures relating to short-term plans. As the DRRR (2002) requirements are for 
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long-term incentive plans, some of the mandated disclosures are irrelevant for annual 
bonus plans. These include disclosures pertaining to share option grant and expiry dates, 
exercise price, and length of plan. However, other disclosure requirements for long-term 
incentive plans such as plan targets, terms and conditions triggering rewards, and the 
form of the reward are equally applicable to annual bonus plans as they are to long-term 
remuneration arrangements.  
 Using the above as a framework, I construct an index comprising the following 
five disclosure dimensions: performance measure disclosures, target disclosures, 
benchmark disclosures, reward disclosures, and other information. Performance measure 
disclosures consist of disclosures relating to the use of performance measures in the 
annual bonus plan, in particular disclosure of the performance measure itself and the 
corresponding performance period. Target disclosures refer to the use of performance 
targets and target thresholds, and disclosures of the actual targets and target thresholds 
used. Targets are set by management and upon attainment, trigger the rewards associated 
to them. Benchmark disclosures refer to the use and form of performance benchmarks, 
including details of peer groups used. Benchmark are measures against which targets are 
set against. For instance, a firm would set an eps growth target benchmarked against the 
growth in RPI.  Rewards disclosures relate to the form of the reward or bonus, the 
amount of the reward or bonus, and whether the firm applies a cap on the level of bonus 
payments. Disclosures relating to participants in the scheme, weightings on different 
performance measures, the use of discretion in the scheme and any other additional 
information are captured in the other disclosures category. Further details are provided in 
the appendix. 
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 To obtain index scores, annual bonus disclosures in the remuneration report are 
analysed for each firm using the criteria outlined in the appendix. A score of one is 
assigned if the disclosure item is present and zero otherwise. The aim of the index is to 
capture the informativeness of disclosures. For instance, in assessing disclosures relating 
to peer groups, a score of one is awarded if the disclosure mentions peer groups, whether 
firms employ them or not in the bonus plan, as this indicates that the firm at the very 
least considered the idea of peer groups, which is informative to the shareholder. A score 
of zero is only given when no mention is made of peer groups. Scores are aggregated for 
each of the five dimensions, and dimension scores are then totalled to obtain the firm 
disclosure quality score.  
 The scores were then normalised, following Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001). 
This is calculated as follows: the sample mean and standard deviation for each dimension 
(Performance Measure, Target, Benchmark, Reward and Other) is computed. Each 
dimension score for each firm (firm-dimension score) is then normalised by subtracting 
the dimension sample mean from each firm-dimension score and dividing by the 
dimension sample standard deviation. The final score is then obtained by summing 
across the five normalised dimension scores. The main advantage of this method is that it 
normalises the score for each dimension. This eliminates any bias that may result from 
having an unequal number of items in a dimension.  
In addition, I also calculate the disclosure score using two alternative methods, 
which are used as sensitivity tests in Section 5.2. These methods, as well as a detailed 
explanation of the scoring process for a randomly selected firm, are presented in 
Appendix A.  
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Measuring Disclosure Quantity 
  Disclosure quantity captures the total volume of information disclosed concerning 
remuneration practices. This is defined as a relative quantity measure, where the number 
of pages in the remuneration report is scaled by the total number of pages in the annual 
report. I use a scaled metric to control for the fact that large firms disclose more (Lang 
and Lundholm, 1993). A similar approach was employed by Cowan et al. (1987) to 
measure the quantity of social responsibility disclosures.  
 
Political Sensitivity 
As discussed in the literature review section, firm size has been widely used in 
the accounting literature to measure political sensitivity (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978; 
Raffournier, 1995; Oliviera et al, 2005; Meek et al, 1995). However, this approach is 
problematic because firm size captures a multitude of other factors (Ball and Foster, 
1982, Meek et al, 1995; Cormier et al, 2005). It also may fail to capture elements specific 
to executive remuneration. The approach taken in this paper is aimed at overcoming 
these limitations.  
I measure political sensitivity using managerial remuneration data, measured as 
the average annual bonus payments computed for executive board members of firm i at 
time t. I use raw (actual) bonus payments as well as unexplained (excessive) bonus, 
following on from Baker (1999) who established that excessive executive remuneration 
increased firms‟ political costs. I estimate excessive executive bonuses using the 
following model:  
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where pay is the bonus for firm i at time t;
 3
 perform is firm i‟s performance 
measured using 12-month share returns and return on equity;
 4
 and firmsize is measured 
using beginning-of-period market capitalisation. This approach is similar to the 
procedure used by Yermack (1998) and Agrawal and Walking (1994), where over- (or 
under-) payment is measured using the residuals from a regression of pay against 
performance factors, after controlling for size and industry membership.  I estimate 
regression (3) using ranks rather than raw values to minimise the impact of extreme 
observations (Iman and Canover, 1979). I use to construct an indicator variable for 
excessive bonus payments that takes the value of one when it > 0 and zero otherwise. 
The indicator variable is then used as remmeasure variable in equations (1) and (2). 
While principal tests measure political sensitivity using bonus payments to ensure 
consistency with the aspect of disclosure being analysed, in supplementary tests I also 
construct political sensitivity proxies using salary, total cash benefits, and total cash 
remuneration (i.e., salary plus cash bonus plus cash benefits).  
 
Control Variables 
Disclosure Propensity 
 Propensity to disclose controls for firms‟ overall disclosure strategy (Lang and 
Lundholm, 1993; Clarkson et al., 1999).  I measure disclosure propensity as the natural 
log of the total number of pages in the annual report and accounts (including summary 
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reports, corporate social disclosure reports and other related items published at time t 
following Clarkson et al., 2003; Li et al., 1997; and Scott, 1994).     
 
Remuneration consultants 
Evidence indicates that when firms engage an external advisor, there is an 
observable effect on the quality of related outputs. For example, Dunn and Mayhew 
(2004) find that the use of audit firms that have specialist knowledge of certain industries 
is positively related to clients‟ disclosure quality, while Defond and Jiambalvo (1991) 
find that clients of major audit firms are less likely to have irregularities in the financial 
statements, suggesting that advisor identity could affect output quality. Bebchuk et al. 
(2002) meanwhile argue that the use of advisors such as remuneration consultants could 
help firms camouflage rent extracting activities during remuneration contract 
negotiations, thereby helping to minimise outrage costs. The DRRR (2002) requires 
firms to disclose the identities of remuneration consultants used during the reporting 
period. Using this information I construct an indicator variable to proxy for the use of a 
remuneration consultant.  
 
 Size and Industry  
Prior research suggests that disclosure quantity and quality vary by industry (e.g., 
Meek et al, 1995). I use a vector of industry dummy variables to control for sector 
membership, based on Datastream‟s Level-3 Industry Classification. Research also 
documents that firm size affects the quality and quantity of disclosures that firms make 
(Chow and Boren-Wong, 1987, Zimmerman, 1983; Meek et al, 1995). Ceteris paribus, 
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larger firms are expected to have greater resources to provide more disclosures and 
disclosures of a higher quality. However, as Ball and Foster (1982) discuss, it is unclear 
what size actually captures. I used beginning-of-period market capitalisation to proxy for 
firm size.  
Prior work has not distinguished between disclosure quality and disclosure 
quantity, making it difficult to assess whether variables drive disclosure quality, 
disclosure quantity, or both. Therefore, I employ similar control variables for the 
disclosure quality model and the disclosure quantity model. I control for the volume of 
disclosure in the disclosure quality model as firms that disclose more are likely to 
disclose better quality information. In the disclosure quantity model, I omit this control 
variable as it is equal to the dependent variable. While this may raise endogeneity issues, 
I do not see this affecting the model, as disclosure quantity is only used as a control 
variable. Accordingly, the control variables for the disclosure quality model are firm size, 
use of compensation consultants, firm propensity to disclose, and disclosure quantity; 
and the control variables for the disclosure quantity model are firm size, use of 
compensation consultants and firm‟s propensity to disclose.  
 
4. Sample, Data Collection and Descriptive Statistics 
Sample Selection 
The sample for this study is 440 largest London Stock Exchange-listed firms 
(excluding investment trusts) ranked by market capitalisation on 31 January 2003. Firms 
were ranked at January 2003 because the Directors‟ Remuneration Report Regulations 
(2002) came into effect for financial years ending on or after 31 December 2002, 
meaning that remuneration reports published in 2003 (relating to the 2002 fiscal year) 
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were the first to comply with the new disclosure requirements. From this, forty firms 
were dropped due missing annual bonus plan information and missing outstanding shares 
and share price information on Datastream. The final sample therefore comprises 400 
firms each with annual bonus plans.  
 
Data  
Annual bonus plan data required to compute the disclosure quality index are 
manually extracted from the annual bonus section of the remuneration report in each 
firms‟ published annual report and accounts. Cash remuneration data including salary, 
cash bonuses, cash benefits, and other cash remuneration for all executive members of 
the board are obtained in the first instance from Manifest Ltd. Compensation data are 
missing from the Manifest dataset for 43 firms. For these cases, data were hand collected 
from the remuneration report section of the corresponding firm‟s published annual report 
and accounts.  
 Market capitalisation data (calculated using share price and number of 
outstanding shares) are collected from Datastream. Industry classifications are also 
obtained from Datastream. The identities of remuneration consultants employed during 
the reporting period are collected manually from the remuneration report as the DRRR 
(2002) requires firms to disclose the identity of all remuneration consultants used during 
the period. I also manually collect the number of pages in the remuneration report in the 
annual report.  
 
Descriptive Statistics 
<TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE> 
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Descriptive statistics for sample firms are presented in Table 1, which reports the 
distribution of firms by industry and balance sheet dates for firms in the sample, together 
with the percentage of firms that use remuneration consultants. The sample is 
characterised by a degree of clustering, with 35.75% of firms operating in the cyclical 
services industry. The next largest industry is the finance sector with 18.75%. Although 
cyclical services (26.12%) and finance (11.93%) are the two largest industries 
represented in the Datastream universe respectively, they are overrepresented in my 
sample. Almost half (45.75%) of firms have 31 December year-ends.  
Panel A of Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the disclosure quality index. 
The maximum score is 9.80, while the mean (median) is -0.02 (0.76). Performance 
measures are the most transparently reported item, with sample firms disclosing at least 
one item measured in the index. In the target, benchmark and reward disclosure 
dimensions, more than half of the scored items are disclosed by the firms, whereas for 
the Other Disclosures category, disclosure is poor with less than half the listed being 
disclosed. The three items characterised by the poorest disclosure are the weightings of 
the different performance measures, disclosures concerning managerial discretion in the 
award of bonuses, and disclosures concerning the use of peer groups. There is some 
moderate variance in the scores. , and this is consistent across all methods of index score 
calculations.  
<TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE> 
 Panel B of Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables 
used in models (1) and (2). The mean (median) firm has a market capitalisation of £462m 
(£33m) and publishes an annual report with 69 (64) pages, of which 7 (6) are devoted to 
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the remuneration report. The mean (median) firm pays executive board members an 
average of £1.09 million (£0.92 million) in salary, £542,397 (£320,000) in bonuses and 
£1.89 million (£1.48 million) in total cash remuneration. The median firm also employs a 
compensation consultant.   
These levels are higher than those reported by Conyon and Murphy (2000) but 
comparable to those presented by Conyon et al (2006) using more recent data. Conyon 
and Murphy (2000) report median CEO salary of £240,000 and average median CEO 
bonus of £91,000. Conyon et al. (2006) report average CEO total pay (total cash pay, 
shares, option grants and other pay) of £2.23 million. 
 5
  
 The standard deviation and the difference between the mean and medians of 
variables such as total cash remuneration and market capitalisation suggest that there are 
large outliers in the data. While omitting these outliers would help limit their impact on 
subsequent empirical tests, trimming reduces the richness of the observations in the 
sample.  I therefore use rank regressions to control for extreme observations without 
deleting any observations. Rank regressions involve ranking all observations for each 
variable and then estimating OLS regressions on the rank-transformed data.  This 
approach was advocated by Iman and Conover (1979), who show that in data sets where 
outliers cannot be ignored, other regression techniques such as rank regressions are 
preferable.  
 
5. Analysis 
 This section examines the relation between firm political sensitivity (proxied by 
average executive bonus) and the quality and quantity of annual bonus plan disclosures 
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in the remuneration reports of 400 large UK firms listed on the London Stock Exchange 
for the financial year of 2002. I report the main regression results in Section 5.1 and 
additional sensitivity analyses in Section 5.2.  
 
Preliminary Results  
Table 3 reports regression summary statistics and coefficient estimates for the 
disclosure quality and disclosure quantity rank regression models. The raw pay 
estimations (column 2 for disclosure quality and column 4 for disclosure quantity) 
measure political sensitivity as the average bonus per executive director. The 
unexplained pay estimations (column 3 for disclosure quality and column 5 for disclosure 
quantity) measure political sensitivity as the overpayment of bonuses conditional on firm 
performance. Disclosure quality is measured using the normalised disclosure quality 
index score. 
<TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE> 
 Results indicate a significant negative relation between disclosure quality and 
political sensitivity for both raw and unexplained pay estimations, with coefficients of -
0.109 (p-value: 0.05) for the raw pay estimation and -0.123 (p-value: 0.04) for the 
unexplained pay estimation (All probability values relate to two-tailed tests unless 
otherwise stated). Meanwhile, for the disclosure quantity model, I observe a positive and 
significant relation between disclosure quantity and political sensitivity for both 
estimations, with coefficient estimates of 0.096 (p-value: 0.02) for the raw pay estimation 
and 0.105 (p-value: 0.02) for the unexplained pay estimation. 
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The results of the regressions have interesting implications. Political cost theory 
predicts that firms that are more politically sensitive provide higher quality (more 
information) disclosures to minimise potential political costs. In contrast, I observe a 
negative and significant relation between political sensitivity and disclosure quality 
exists. These findings imply that as political sensitivity in the form of higher bonus 
payments increases, disclosure quality declines and the degree of opacity increases. At 
the same time, the positive and significant relation between disclosure quantity and 
political sensitivity implies that politically sensitive firms provide more disclosures. This 
result is consistent with political cost theory and managerial power theory, both of which 
predict that firms facing higher political visibility provide more information in an attempt 
to minimise political costs.  
Overall results suggest that when firms are faced with high political costs 
associated with executive remuneration, management tend to provide a larger volume of 
disclosure concerning annual bonus plans but at the same time these disclosures tend to 
be of lower quality. It also underlines the need to differentiate between disclosure 
quantity and disclosure quality when it comes to studying voluntary disclosure, as the 
results of this paper suggests that they are two different measures.  
There is little direct guidance in extant literature which maps perfectly onto the 
work in this study which could help explain these findings. Meek et al. (1995) found a 
positive and significant relation between political sensitivity and disclosure. However, 
their results are difficult to interpret for several reasons. First, their study did not extend 
to voluntary disclosures relating to executive remuneration. Second, they did not 
differentiate between disclosure quality and disclosure quantity. Clarkson et al. (2006), 
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meanwhile, found that for CEO remuneration disclosures of Australian firms, disclosure 
quality was positively and significantly related to two measures of political visibility: 
firm size and public scrutiny. However, they attribute this to detailed black letter legal 
requirements as opposed to principles-based legislation (Clarkson et al, 2006).   
Both the disclosure quality and the disclosure quantity models control for the 
effects of remuneration consultants, firm size and industry effects. Studies by Defond and 
Jiambalvo (1991) and Dunn and Mayhew (2004) find that the use of external consultants 
affects disclosure quality. I find an insignificant advisor effect on disclosure quality, but 
a highly significant relation (p-value >0.001 for all models) between disclosure quantity 
and the presence of a remuneration consultant. These findings suggest that firms 
employing remuneration consultants provide more extensive bonus-related disclosures 
but this does not necessarily translate into higher (i.e., more informative) disclosure 
quality. Bebchuk et al. (2002) contend that the lack of an arms‟ length transaction 
environment between advisors (remuneration consultants) and management may help the 
latter to camouflage rent extraction activities. To the best of my knowledge, no previous 
research provides evidence on how the use of remuneration consultants impact disclosure 
quality and quantity.  
The estimated coefficient on firm size is generally positive and significant in both 
the disclosure quality and quantity regressions. This result is consistent with previous 
research documenting a significant positive relation between size and disclosure (e.g., 
Meek et al., 1995; Raffournier, 1999). In previous studies, size is used to explain political 
sensitivity. In the models used in this paper, other proxies (executive remuneration) are 
used to capture political sensitivity relating specifically to bonus payments, but the 
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significant size effect corroborates various arguments that size is a convoluted measure 
that has various explanations. While it proves that firm size affects disclosure quality and 
quantity, size may also capture items such as information production cost or analyst 
monitoring (Meek et al, 1995; Ball and Foster, 1982). However, the political costs 
associated with bonus-related payments are incrementally significant beyond more 
general political factors captured by firm size.  
Partial F-tests for the vector of industry dummy variables in the raw 
(unexplained) disclosure quality model have p-values of 0.633 (0.802), and 0.468 (0.674) 
for the disclosure quantity model. These statistics indicate that no significant variation in 
disclosure quality and quantity across industry sectors. Adjusted R-squareds are 0.039 for 
the raw and unexplained estimations of the disclosure quality model, and 0.485 and 0.488 
for the raw and unexplained pay estimations of the disclosure quantity model, 
respectively. The disclosure quantity models have higher adjusted R-squareds compared 
to the disclosure quality models, which can be explained by the large size effect in the 
disclosure quantity regressions.  
With reference to extant theory, results reported in Table 3 seem more consistent 
with managerial power theory than political cost theory. Managerial power enables 
managers to award themselves larger bonuses for a particular level of performance 
because managerial power negates the need for them to bargain their remuneration 
contracts at arm‟s length. Managerial power theory suggests that having done so, 
management then look to minimise outrage over their rent extraction activities (excessive 
bonus payment) by camouflaging information through a higher volume of disclosures. In 
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contrast to the predictions of political cost theory, disclosure quantity increases with 
political sensitivity but disclosure quality decreases as political sensitivity increases.  
 
Sensitivity Tests 
 I test the robustness of my results using alternative specifications of disclosure 
quality, which is discussed in Section 5.2.1, and alternative specifications of political 
sensitivity as described discussed in Section 5.2.2. 
 
Alternative Specifications of Disclosure Quality 
 Table 4 presents regression estimates using alternative specifications of 
disclosure quality. Similar to the main regression results, there exists a negative and 
significant relation between disclosure quality and political sensitivity for both raw and 
unexplained models regardless of whether disclosure quality is measured using total 
score, where p-values of 0.026 and 0.021 are reported for raw and unexplained 
respectively, or percentage score, where p-values of 0.027 and 0.030 are reported for raw 
and unexplained respectively. All tests are two-tailed unless otherwise indicated. These 
results indicate that results reported in Table 4 are robust to alternate methods of 
measuring disclosure quality.  
<TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE> 
Results for the control variables are also robust to the alternative methods of 
disclosure quality measurement. Size is significant at the 10% level for the raw models 
under both total score and percentage calculation methods, and marginally close to 
significant for the unexplained variables, with p-values of 0.182 and 0.119 respectively. 
The presence of a remuneration consultant has no statistically significant effect on 
  31 
disclosure quality for both calculation methods under both models. I also observe no 
significant variation in disclosure quality across industry sectors when alternative 
specifications of disclosure quality are employed.  
 
 Alternative Specifications of Political Sensitivity 
My main analysis uses annual bonus payments to proxy for political sensitivity. As an 
additional test, I use other forms of remuneration, namely salary, total remuneration and 
cash benefits as proxies for political sensitivity. As the study focuses on the disclosure of 
annual bonus schemes, it is interesting to see whether political sensitivity of the other 
components of executive pay also affects the level and quality of disclosures made 
relating to bonus payments.  
<TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE> 
Panel A of Table 5 presents regression results when annual bonus is replaced by 
salary. Columns 2 and 4 present the results of the raw pay estimations, and Columns 3 
and 5 present the results of the unexplained pay estimations. Intuitively, I would expect 
that salary is less significantly related to the levels of annual bonus disclosures, and 
therefore a significant relationship does not exist. Accordingly, I observe that the relation 
between disclosure quality and political sensitivity as proxied by average salary is 
negative and insignificant for the raw pay estimation and is negative and significant 
(0.100) when estimated as unexplained pay. I observe similar relationships when salary is 
expressed as industry adjusted salary, but the relation is negative and insignificant when 
salary is expressed as the salary of the highest paid director. Different specifications of 
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disclosure quality (not presented in the tables) also yield a negative and insignificant 
relation for both raw and unexplained salary estimations.  
Similarly for the disclosure quantity models, the relation between disclosure 
quantity and political sensitivity is positive and insignificant when political sensitivity is 
measured as the raw average salary per executive director, (0.108) but is weakly 
significant when measured as the unexplained salary  (0.087).  
Panel B of Table 5 presents the regression estimations when political sensitivity 
was measured using total cash remuneration. Total cash remuneration is defined as salary 
plus bonus plus benefits plus other cash remuneration items. Intuitively it is expected that 
total remuneration is highly sensitive to public scrutiny, and I expect to see a significant 
relationship between political sensitivity and disclosure quality and quantity. The results 
are consistent with the intuition. The relationship between disclosure quality and political 
sensitivity is significantly negative for both the raw (0.037, two-tailed) and unexplained 
pay (0.009, two-tailed) estimations. The observed relation between disclosure quality and 
political sensitivity above are robust to alternative calculations of the disclosure quality 
index (not reported in tables). The relation between disclosure quantity and political 
sensitivity when measured as average total cash remuneration is significant and positive 
for both the raw (0.0004, two tailed) and unexplained pay (0.003, two tailed) estimations.  
Table 5 Panel C shows the results of the regression model when political 
sensitivity is measured using raw and excess average benefits per director. As benefits 
are specified in the remuneration contract and is often a contractual obligation, it is rarely 
contingent on performance. As such, it is not expected that benefits would show any 
significant relationship with disclosure quality or disclosure quantity.  
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 On the whole, the results are insignificant with mixed signs. Disclosure quality is 
negative and insignificantly related to political sensitivity when specified as raw benefits, 
but positively and insignificantly related to political sensitivity when specified as excess 
benefits relative to performance. The relation between disclosure quantity and political 
sensitivity are positive and insignificant when political sensitivity is measured using raw 
and unexplained average benefits.  
 
6. Summary and Conclusion 
 This paper discusses the impact of political sensitivity on the quality and quantity 
of annual bonus plan disclosures in a sample of 400 large UK firms. Running two 
separate regression models, one for disclosure quality and one for disclosure quantity, I 
find that disclosure quantity increases with political sensitivity, but disclosure quality 
decreases as firms become more politically sensitive. This contradicts with political cost 
theory, which is often used to explain the relationship between political sensitivity and 
disclosure. However, this observation fits with the managerial power theory, which 
suggests that firms have incentives to obfuscate their rent extracting activities for as long 
as they possibly can. The findings suggest that managers mask their rent extraction 
activities, in this case, excessive remuneration, by providing high volume but low quality 
disclosures. I find this observation to be generally robust across different disclosure 
quality index scoring techniques and different measures and specifications of political 
sensitivity.  
 This paper adds to existing literature in the following ways. First, I extend prior 
work in the disclosure and political sensitivity area by providing evidence on how the 
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quality and quantity of voluntary executive remuneration disclosures vary in relation to 
how politically sensitive managerial pay is. Earlier papers have provided evidence on 
other forms of voluntary disclosure relate to political sensitivity, albeit testing for 
political sensitivity as part of a larger set of variables (Meek et al, 1995; Cormier et al, 
2005). This is the first study, to the best of my knowledge that studies executive 
remuneration disclosure in the same manner. 
 Second, in this study I separate disclosure quality and disclosure quantity, an 
approach that has yet to be used in one study at the same time. Earlier work have either 
focused on either disclosure quantity or disclosure quality (Raffournier, 1999) or as in the 
case of Meek et al. (1995), is vague as to which aspect of disclosure is actually being 
studied. This separation leads onto the third contribution of the paper, which is the use of 
managerial power theory to explain the relation between disclosure and political 
sensitivity. Prior studies have focused political cost theory to explain this relationship. In 
this paper the different observations for the relationship between disclosure quality and 
disclosure quantity and political sensitivity suggests that managerial opportunism cannot 
be discounted as an explanation for the varying levels of voluntary disclosures made.   
 The limitations of this study are as follows. First, a more refined way of 
measuring disclosure quality needs to be established. Prior papers have self-constructed 
indices to gauge disclosure quality (Raffournier, 1999; Clarkson et al. 2006), and each 
index constitutes of different measures which the authors perceive have information 
content to the users. The disclosure quality regression estimates yield a low adjusted r-
squared figure, which may be of some cause for concern.  
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 Second, while firms can and do obfuscate their activities by providing low quality 
disclosure information, this can only be done up to a point where the costs of disclosure 
are greater than potential outrage costs. We still do not know where this point lies. It is 
probable that this point exists at different levels for different groups of disclosures, and 
this may well vary from time to time, subject to factors such as the availability of 
information from other sources and current political climate. 
 Future studies could look at refining the disclosure quality measuring process, 
perhaps using more sophisticated techniques such as content analysis. Also, it would be 
interesting to apply the same tests for other voluntary disclosures, such as environmental 
reports and corporate social responsibility disclosures, to see if managerial power theory 
extends to these disclosures as well.  
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APPENDIX 
Disclosure Index Dimensions and Calculation Methods 
 
The disclosure index is calculated based on the following dimensions: 
 
Performance 
Measures 
Targets Benchmarking Targets 
Other 
Disclosures 
Use of 
performance 
measures 
Use of 
performance 
targets 
Benchmarking 
Firm Performance 
Use of 
performance 
targets 
Participants of the 
scheme 
The actual 
performance 
measure 
Use of target 
thresholds 
Identity of 
Benchmarks 
Use of target 
thresholds 
Weightings on 
different 
performance 
measures 
The related 
performance 
period 
The actual target 
Use of Peer 
Groups 
The actual target 
Discretionary 
elements of the 
scheme 
 
The actual 
thresholds 
 
The actual 
thresholds 
Any other 
additional 
information 
 
 
An example of the disclosure index scoring process for Aegis plc is detailed below: 
 
Annual Bonus Disclosure Statement, Aegis plc Annual Report 2003 
All of the executive directors participate in the Group’s Annual Cash Bonus Scheme based upon 
achievement of individual objectives and financial targets (profit before tax and management 
charges) linked to Group and, in the case of directors with operational responsibilities, regional 
performance. This may result in the payment of cash bonuses of up to 25% of base salary for on-
target financial performance, with the opportunity to earn higher bonuses for exceptional 
performance up to 75% of base salary (100% for the Chief Executive Officer).  
 
Additional, the executive directors with operational responsibilities (Adrian Chedore and David 
Verklin) participate in a separate deferred annual cash bonus scheme based on achievement of a 
demanding year on year excess profit above target financial performance of the businesses for 
which they are responsible. The payment of half of any such bonus is deferred for one year. This 
deferred bonus will normally be forfeited in the event that the director leaves the Group. 
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Performance 
Measures 
Score for Aegis plc Targets Score for Aegis plc 
Use of performance 
measures 
1 - firm discloses 
usage of individual 
objectives and 
targets, so 
performance 
measures are present 
Use of performance 
targets 
1 – implied from the 
statement that bonus is 
based on achievement of 
financial targets 
The actual 
performance measure 
1 – individual 
objectives and 
financial measures 
Use of target 
thresholds 
1 – on target paid 25%, 
exceptional capped at 
75% with 100% for CEO 
The related 
performance period 
1 – annual bonus is 
assumed to be one 
year unless otherwise 
stated 
The actual target 
0 – actual target figure is 
not disclosed 
  The actual thresholds 
0 – actual target 
thresholds are vague: 
says ‘up to 25%’ but not 
clear what the minimum 
threshold is. 
Total Score for 
Dimension 
3 
Total Score for 
Dimension 
2 
 
Benchmarking Score for Aegis plc Rewards Score for Aegis plc 
Benchmarking Firm 
Performance 
0 – no indication of 
any benchmarks used 
The form of the 
reward / bonus 
1 – cash payment is 
disclosed 
Identity of 
Benchmarks 
0 – no indication of 
benchmarks used 
The amount of the 
reward / bonus 
0 – actual reward amount 
not disclosed 
Use of Peer Groups 
0 – no indication of 
use of peer groups 
A cap on the reward / 
bonus 
1 – reward is capped at 
75% 
Total Score for 
Dimension 
0 
Total Score for 
Dimension 
2 
 
Other Disclosures Score for Aegis plc 
Participants of the scheme 1 – all executive directors participate in the scheme 
Weightings on different performance measures 0 – no disclosure present 
Discretionary elements of the scheme 
1 – ‘Exceptional performance’ which warrants 
rewards maximised at the cap is not defined. This 
implies discretionary awards are possible. 
Any other additional information 
0 – no additional information present that would 
help shareholders understand the bonus scheme 
better. 
Total Score for Dimension 2 
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These scores are then calculated using the normalised, total score and percentage 
techniques: 
Normalised Method    
 
The normalised score is calculated 
in two steps. The mean and the 
standard deviation  is  computed for 
each dimension (Performance 
Measure, Target, Benchmark, 
Reward and Other) are. Then, all 
dimension scores for each firm 
(firm-dimension scores) are added, 
and then normalised by subtracting 
the dimension mean from each 
firm-dimension score and dividing it 
by the standard deviation. The final 
score is then obtained by adding 
each firm-dimension score for each 
firm. The main advantage of using 
this method is that it normalises the 
score for each dimension, thereby 
eliminating any bias of one 
dimension having more items than 
others. This follows Bertrand and 
Mullainathan (2001) 
 
Performance Measure Dimension  
Total Score 3 
Mean 2.902 
Standard Deviation 0.319 
Normalised Score 0.031 
  
This is repeated for every dimension  
Other dimension scores  
Targets -0.082 
Benchmarking -2.842 
Rewards 0.249 
Other     0.929 
  
 Total Normalised Score -2.178 
 
Total Score Method    
 
Total score is calculated computing 
the dimension score for each firm 
by dimension (firm-dimension 
scores), and then adding all firm-
dimension scores together to obtain 
the firm score. This follows 
Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) 
Performance Measure 3 
Targets 2 
Benchmarking 0 
Rewards 2 
Other 2 
  
 Total Score for the firm 9 
 
Percentage Method 
  
Total 
Score 
Max 
Score % 
Equal 
Weight 
Weigh- 
ted 
Score 
Under the equal-weighted method, 
each dimension is assigned equal 
weighting. As there are five 
dimensions, each dimension is 
assigned a weighting of 20% 
(0.20). Each firm dimension score 
is adjusted by this weight and then, 
weigh-adjusted firm-dimension 
scores are summed to obtain a firm 
score, which ranges between 0 at 
the minimum and 1 at the 
maximum. This follows Black et al 
(2006). 
Perform-
ance 
Measure 3 3 1.00 0.20 0.20 
Targets 2 4 0.50 0.20 0.10 
Bench-
marking 0 3 0.00 0.20 0.00 
Rewards 2 3 0.67 0.20 0.13 
Other 2 4 0.50 0.20 0.10 
      
 Total 
Score for 
the firm         0.53 
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NOTES 
 
1
 This included firm remuneration policy on matters such as pay levels, comparator groups, performance 
criteria, pensions, service contracts and early termination 
2
 This measure is not scaled by firm size although it was initially considered, as the regression is already 
controlled for size.  
3
  In sensitivity tests, bonus is substituted with salary, total cash remuneration and benefits respectively 
4
 Sloan (1993) suggests that a mixture of accounting and market based measures best reflect a firm‟s 
performance, and both should be used in evaluating firm performance. 
5
 Translated from the US$ data at the exchange rate £1 = US$ 1.6355 
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TABLE 1 
Descriptive Statistics of Sample Firms 
           
Panel A : Distribution of Financial Year Ends, Industry and Advisor Use of Firms in the Sample  
 
Financial Year 
End   Industry    Advisors  
Date Firms %   Industry Firms %   Advisors Firms % 
31-Dec-02 10 2.50%  BASIC 44 11.00%  No 87 21.75% 
31-Jan-03 14 3.50%  CYCGD 6 1.50%  Yes 313 78.25% 
28-Feb-03 6 1.50%  CYSER 143 35.75%     
31-Mar-03 97 24.25%  GENIN 37 9.25%     
30-Apr-03 15 3.75%  ITECH 19 4.75%     
31-May-03 3 0.75%  NCYCG 38 9.50%     
30-Jun-03 22 5.50%  NCYSR 15 3.75%     
31-Jul-03 7 1.75%  RESOR 10 2.50%     
31-Aug-03 6 1.50%  TOTLF 75 18.75%     
30-Sep-03 31 7.75%  UTILS 13 3.25%     
31-Oct-03 6 1.50%         
30-Nov-03 0 0.00%         
31-Dec-03 183 45.75%                 
           
The table presents the distribution of financial year ends, industries and the use of remuneration consultants by sample firms. 
Financial Year End was manually collected from annual reports. Industry categories are Datastream Level 3 Industries, 
where BASIC is basic industries, CYCGD is cyclical goods, CYSER is cyclical services, GENIN is general industries, 
ITECH is information technology, NCYCG is non-cyclical goods, NCYSR is non-cyclical services, RESOR is natural 
resources and mining, TOTLF is finance and UTILS is utilities. Firm use of remuneration consultants (advisors) were 
manually collected from the remuneration reports of the respective firms. 
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TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics of Variables Used in Regression Estimates 
                        
Panel A: Disclosure Quality Score          
    Mean   Std Dev   
Lower 
Quartile   Median   
Upper 
Quartile 
Normalised Index Score  Total -0.020  2.730  -1.880  0.760  2.310 
 PerfMeas 0.000  1.010  0.300  0.300  0.300 
 Tgt 0.010  1.010  -0.810  0.440  0.440 
 Bmark 0.010  1.020  -1.150  0.540  0.540 
 Rwd 0.000  1.000  0.250  0.250  0.250 
 Oth 0.000  1.000  -0.470  -0.470  0.930 
           
 
Panel B: Explanatory Variables          
  
  Mean   Std Dev   
Lower 
Quartile   Median   
Upper 
Quartile 
ARPages 68.77  24.64  54  64  76 
RR Pages 6.82  2.66  5  6  8 
RRinAR  0.1  0.03  0.08  0.1  0.12 
CompCons 0.78  0.41  1  1  1 
TCR (‘000) £1,886  £1,475  £997  £1,481  £2,321 
Cash Bonus (‘000) £542  £843  £115  £320  £634 
Salary  (‘000) £1,093  £669  £642  £924  £1,295 
Market capital (millions) 
 
£4,616  £40,515  £142  £331  £1,080 
Panel A presents the descriptive statistics of the disclosure quality index. The index comprises of five dimensions, Perfmeas (perfomance 
measurement disclosures), Tgt (target disclosures), Bmark (benchmark disclosures), Rwd (reward disclosures) and Oth (other disclosures). The 
index score is calculated by demeaning each firm dimension score. All disclosure information were obtained from the annual bonus plan 
disclosure section of the remuneration reports and manually coded. See Appendix for individual breakdown of disclosure items in each 
dimension.  Panel B presents the descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables used in the study. The sample consists of 400 large UK-
listed firms (not including investment trusts) measured by market capital as at 31 January 2003. All annual reports are from the fiscal year of 
2002. ARPages is the number of pages of the annual report. RRPages is the number of pages of the remuneration report in the annual report.  
RRinAR is the percentage of the remuneration report as a fraction of the full annual report. CompCons is an indicator variable that takes a 
value of one if the firm uses a compensation consultant and zero otherwise. TCR is total cash remuneration, which is the sum of the average 
salary, cash bonus and benefits per director for the 2002 fiscal year paid by the firm. Cash Bonus and Salary are average cash bonuses and 
salaries per director for the fiscal year 2002. All remuneration data were obtained from Manifest, and in the event of missing items, manually 
collected from remuneration reports. Market Capital is measured using the closing share price as at firm balance sheet date, multiplied by the 
number of outstanding shares on the same date. Both data were collected from Datastream.  
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TABLE 3 
Rank Regression Results 
 
 
Political Sensitivity and Disclosure Quality & Disclosure Quantity 
   
Disclosure 
 Quality  
Disclosure 
 Quantity 
      Raw   Unexplained   Raw   Unexplained 
 intercept  277.67  242.682  -85.199  -50.139 
   (0.133)  (0.175)  (0.526)  (0.699) 
 remmeasure -0.109  -0.123  0.096  0.105 
   (0.056)  (0.038)  (0.019)  (0.015) 
 lnmktcap  0.118  0.091  0.177  0.199 
   (0.068)  (0.155)  (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
 advisor  0.111  0.098  0.231  0.229 
   (0.150)  (0.203)  (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
 disclosure  -0.001  -0.006  0.446  0.448 
   (0.999)  (0.927)  (<.0001)  (<.000)1 
 percentrr  -0.049  -0.05     
   (0.347)  (0.347)     
 
Industry 
dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 
 
Partial F-test 
p-values 
(industry)         
   0.633  0.802  0.469  0.674 
 Rsq  0.072  0.073  0.501  0.505 
 Adjrsq  0.039  0.039  0.485  0.488 
 
 
The table presents the coefficients and p-values (in parentheses) from the OLS rank regressions to assess the 
relation between political sensitivity and disclosure quality and quantity. Disclosure Quality is measured using 
normalised index scores. Disclosure Quantity is measured using the percentage of remuneration report pages in 
the annual report. remmeasure is the rank of average cash bonus payments per director, proxying for political 
sensitivity, expressed as raw (columns 2 and 4) and unexplained (columns 3 and 5). The raw regressions are 
estimated by using the absolute amount of average cash bonus payments as remmeasure. The unexplained 
regressions are estimated by constructing remmeasure to be an indicator variable. The indicator variable is 
computed by regressing average cash bonuses against performance, where a positive residual value indicates 
overpayment (denoted as one) and a negative residual value indicates underpayment (denoted as zero). lnmktcap 
is the rank of the natural log of market capital, computed by multiplying the closing share price by the number of 
shares outstanding as on the balance sheet date. advisor is the rank of the indicator variable that takes a value of 
one if a firm employs a compensation consultant, and zero otherwise. disclosure is the rank of the firms‟ annual 
report and related disclosure pages, which proxies for firms‟ propensity to disclose. percentrr is the rank of the 
percentage of remuneration report pages as a fraction of pages in the annual report. The regression is controlled 
for industry, and partial F scores test for the variation in disclosure quality and quantity in different industries.  
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TABLE 4 
Rank Regression Results of Sensitivity Tests: Alternative Measures of Disclosure Quality 
 
Political Sensitivity and Disclosure Quality: Alternative Measures of Disclosure Quality 
  Total Score  Percentage Score 
    Raw Unexplained   Raw Unexpl. 
intercept  255.308 215.295  288.050 244.5195 
  (0.158) (0.220)  (0.109) (0.170) 
remmeasure  -0.124 -0.134  -0.127 -0.129 
  (0.026) (0.021)  (0.027) (0.03) 
lnmktcap  0.114 0.084  0.131 0.099 
  (0.070) (0.182)  (0.042) (0.119) 
advisor  0.111 0.101  0.093 0.093 
  (0.143) (0.184)  (0.226) (0.228) 
disclosure  -0.023 -0.030  -0.030 -0.032 
  (0.721) (0.645)  (0.649) (0.624) 
percentrr  -0.047 -0.050  -0.055 -0.054 
  (0.354) (0.341)  (0.290) (0.300) 
Industry 
Dummies  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
 
Partial F-test 
p-values 
(industry)  0.752 0.9584  0.611 0.8224 
rsq  0.008 0.0791  0.0783 0.0778 
adjrsq  0.005 0.0456  0.0448 0.0443 
 
The table presents the coefficients and p-values (in parantheses)  from the OLS rank regressions to assess the relation 
between political sensitivity and disclosure quality using alternative measure of disclosure quality. Disclosure 
Quality is measured using total scores in columns 2 and 3, and percentage score in columns 4 and 5. remmeasure is 
the rank of average cash bonus payments per director, proxying for political sensitivity, expressed as raw (columns 2 
and 4) and unexplained (columns 3 and 5). The raw regressions are estimated by using the absolute amount of 
average cash bonus payments as remmeasure. The unexplained regressions are estimated by constructing 
remmeasure to be an indicator variable. The indicator variable is computed by regressing average cash bonuses 
against performance, where a positive residual value indicates overpayment (denoted as one) and a negative residual 
value indicates underpayment (denoted as zero). lnmktcap is the rank of the natural log of market capital, computed 
by multiplying the closing share price by the number of shares outstanding as on the balance sheet date. advisor is 
the rank of the indicator variable that takes a value of one if a firm employs a compensation consultant, and zero 
otherwise. disclosure is the rank of the firms‟ annual report and related disclosure pages, which proxies for firms‟ 
propensity to disclose. percentrr is the rank of the percentage of remuneration report pages as a fraction of pages in 
the annual report. The regression is controlled for industry, and partial F scores test for the variation in disclosure 
quality and quantity in different industries. 
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TABLE 5 
Rank Regression Results of Sensitivity Tests: Alternative Measures of Political Sensitivity 
 
 
 Panel A: Salary 
  
Disclosure 
 Quality  
Disclosure 
 Quantity 
    Raw   Unexplained   Raw   Unexplained 
Intercept  258.258  248.22  -73.206  -50.867 
  (0.164)  (0.166)  (0.587)  (0.696) 
remmeasure -0.058  -0.109  0.067  0.072 
  (0.312)  (0.060)  (0.108)  (0.089) 
lnmktcap  0.126  0.106  0.166  0.189 
  (0.063)  (0.098)  (0.0007)  (0.0007) 
advisor  0.12  0.108  0.224  0.224 
  (0.122)  (0.164)  (<.0001)  (0.0007) 
disclosure  -0.028  -0.029  0.465  0.468 
  (0.662)  (0.649)  (<.0001)  (0.0007) 
percentrr  -0.059  -0.057     
  (0.254)  (0.277)     
Industry 
dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 
Partial F-
test p-
values 
(industry)  0.688  0.771  0.502  0.639 
Rsq  0.066  0.071  0.497  0.501 
Adjrsq   0.032   0.038   0.481   0.484 
         
Panel B:  Total Cash Remuneration 
  
Disclosure 
 Quality  
Disclosure 
 Quantity 
    Raw   Unexplained   Raw   Unexplained 
Intercept  280.622  241.728  -104.673  -49.505 
  (0.128)  (0.176)  (0.431)  (0.702) 
remmeasure -0.125  -0.153  0.151  0.125 
  (0.0366)  (0.009)  (0.0004)  (0.003) 
Lnmktcap  0.142  0.097  0.141  0.193 
  (0.032)  (0.127)  (0.0032)  (<.0001) 
Advisor  0.111  0.108  0.23  0.22 
  (0.151)  (0.1594)  (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
disclosure  -0.005  -0.016  0.442  0.458 
  (0.939)  (0.7994)  (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
Percentrr  -0.045  -0.046     
  (0.392)  (0.3788)     
Industry 
dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 
Partial F-
test p-
values 
(industry)  0.615  0.824  0.391  0.695 
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Rsq  0.074  0.079  0.51  0.508 
Adjrsq  0.041  0.046  0.494  0.492 
 
 
Panel C: Benefits 
  
Disclosure 
 Quality  
Disclosure 
 Quantity 
    Raw   Unexplained   Raw   Unexplained 
Intercept  236.944  233.468  -60.73  -52.831 
  (0.202)  (0.196)  (0.653)  (0.686) 
remmeasure -0.006  0.005  0.033  0.051 
  (0.902)  (0.928)  (0.375)  (0.221) 
Lnmktcap  0.105  0.103  0.186  0.191 
  (0.104)  (0.108)  (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
Advisor  0.116  0.106  0.23  0.229 
  (0.135)  (0.173)  (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
disclosure  -0.036  -0.042  0.471  0.471 
  (0.572)  (0.517)  (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
Percentrr  -0.063  -0.065     
  (0.229)  (0.213)     
Industry 
dummies 
  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Partial F-
test p-
values 
(industry))  0.761  0.759  0.561  0.618 
Rsq  0.063  0.063  0.495  0.499 
Adjrsq  0.023  0.029  0.478  0.482 
 
The table presents the coefficients and p-values (in parantheses) from the OLS rank regressions using alternative 
forms of remuneration to proxy for political sensitivity. Disclosure Quality is measured using normalised index 
scores. Disclosure Quantity is measured using the percentage of remuneration report pages in the annual report. 
Panel A presents the regression estimates when remmeasure is defined as average salary per director. Panel B 
presents the regression estimates when remmeasure is defined as average total cash remuneration per director, 
where total cash remuneration is the sum of salary, cash bonus and benefits. Panel C presents the regression 
estimates when remmeasure is defined as average benefits. remmeasure is expressed as raw (columns 2 and 4) 
and unexplained (columns 3 and 5). The raw regressions are estimated by using the absolute amount of the 
respective remuneration payments as remmeasure. The unexplained regressions are estimated by constructing 
remmeasure to be an indicator variable. The indicator variable is computed by regressing average cash bonuses 
against performance, where a positive residual value indicates overpayment (denoted as one) and a negative 
residual value indicates underpayment (denoted as zero). lnmktcap is the rank of the natural log of market capital, 
computed by multiplying the closing share price by the number of shares outstanding as on the balance sheet date. 
advisor is the rank of the indicator variable that takes a value of one if a firm employs a compensation consultant, 
and zero otherwise. disclosure is the rank of the firms‟ annual report and related disclosure pages, which proxies 
for firms‟ propensity to disclose. percentrr is the rank of the percentage of remuneration report pages as a fraction 
of pages in the annual report. The regression is controlled for industry, and partial F scores test for the variation in 
disclosure quality and quantity in different industries. 
 
